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Dynamic Expressivism about
Deontic Modality
William B. Starr
As a first approximation, expressivism about deontic discourse holds that an utterance
of Zoyd must share expresses certain motivational attitudes towards sharing, but with-
out referring to and describing, or representing, those attitudes—that would amount
to a form of subjectivism that makes disagreement difficult to capture (Moore, ).1
(I can hardly disagree with your descriptions of your attitudes.) Some philosophers
have sought to connect deontic discourse to motivational attitudes such as desire
because they think it is the only way of explaining how deontic language and thought
motivate us to do things: passive descriptions of things out there in the world lack
the requisite motivational gravitas (Mackie, ). So, the aim of expressivism is
to ground deontic discourse in motivational psychology without making its subject
matter motivational psychological states.2 From this perspective, expressivism is only
distinctive and interesting to the degree that motivational and representational psy-
chological states are distinguishable. I believe this presents a dilemma for expressivists.
If representational thought and talk isn’t substantially different from its motivational
counterparts, then expressivismbecomes elusive anduninteresting. If representational
thought and talk is substantially different from its motivational counterparts, the
existing tools of truth-conditional semantics tailored for representational purposes
should not work for motivational thought and talk. After all, if motivational attitudes
are quite different onewould expect their kinematics, hence their expression andhence
their semantics to also differ. It seems to follow that if expressivism is an interesting
and distinctive position, it faces the Frege-Geach problem. It is not clear, as Frege
() stressed, what logical compounds of non-representational sentences mean and,
1 Note that even on this approximation, expressivism should not be equated with a non-propositional
semantics. A non-propositional semantics, e.g. Hamblin’s () for interrogatives, needn’t involve motiva-
tional attitudes. Further, one could offer a propositional expressivist semantics as long as one had a story
about how those contents are connected to motivational attitudes rather than representational ones. For
discussion see Chrisman (), Schroeder (), Ridge (), and Charlow ().
2 For a more detailed version of this narrative see Schroeder (a, Chapters –).
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as Geach () stressed, it is not clear how non-representational sentences could bear
relations of consequence and consistency.
One goal of this chapter is to press this dilemma against recent expressivists that use
the tools of truth-conditional semantics to model expressive meaning and communi-
cation (Gibbard, ; Dreier, ; Yalcin, , ; Silk, ) (§§–). I will argue
that these accounts either rely on representational concepts that are inappropriate
for expressive motivational discourse, or they end up blurring the distinctions that
make expressivism a distinctive and interesting thesis. In doing so, I will propose
a new way of decomposing the negation problem (§) and argue that expressivism
cannot succeed without a distinctive theory of expressive communication (§). My
other goal is more positive. I will assume for the purposes of the argument set
out that representational language inherits its distinctive semantic properties from
the function of representational attitudes: to track how the world is. Further, I will
assume that motivational attitudes have a very different function, namely to motivate
choice and action, and that motivational language inherits rather different semantic
properties from thismotivational function.This is not somuch because I am confident
in these assumptions, but because they provide the most interesting and challenging
setting to defend expressivism. Against this backdrop, I will use dynamic semantics, a
relatively recent semantic framework discussed in computer science and linguistics,
to offer a model of expressive and representational language where both kinds of
discourse are seamlessly integrated, and where uniform explanations of composition-
ality and logical relations are forthcoming (§§–). Dynamic semantics provides an
algebra of processes rather than contents. I will show how this embodies a more
general conception ofmeaning and logic that yieldsmotivational and representational
meaning as special cases.3
Here at the outset, I should clarify that I will not be offering a positive linguistic
or philosophical argument in favor of expressivism. Yet, linguists and empirically-
minded philosophers of language may find something of interest here. The empirical
investigation of ‘expressive meaning’ is a burgeoning field, whose object of study has
remained somewhat difficult to classify and integrate in compositional systems.4 The
perspective on expressivism, communication and compositional semantics offered
here should be useful for these purposes. The semantics developed here also makes
interestingly different predictions than more orthodox approaches (e.g. Kratzer,
), thereby connecting to a broader debate over non-truth-conditional semantics
3 This emphasis on processes (acceptance, rejection) rather than content is a theme in Gibbard (),
but is not embraced in Gibbard’s formalism. Dynamic semantics provides the tools for doing so. Alwood
() pursues a similar dynamic approach and situates it in more detail with work in metaethics. I aim
to provide a more thorough technical implementation here and connect such an approach to the issue of
communication in expressivism. One virtue of this implementation is not having to distinguish, as Alwood
() must, between two kinds of negation. I will offer one semantics for negation which models both
propositional and expressive negation.
4 E.g. evidentiality (Murray, ; Faller, ), attention (Bittner, ), narrative structure (Hobbs,
), slurs (Anderson and Lepore, ) and other phenomena (Potts, ; McCready, ).
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(Veltman, , p. ; Portner, , p. )5 and expressivist pragmatics (Yalcin, ,
) for modality. Throughout, I will be assuming that expressivism is a semantic
thesis about the linguistic meaning of sentences which challenges the idea that all
communication proceeds by referring to things and describing them. Along the way
(§), I will present difficulties for the idea that expressivism is merely a pragmatic
thesis (Yalcin, , ). Unfortunately, I will not have space to discuss important
recent work that pitches expressivism as a metasemantic thesis (Chrisman, ;
Ridge, ) about how certain expressions get their traditional meanings, or what
it means to ascribe those traditional meanings to those expressions (Carballo, ).
It is interesting to note, however, that the linguistic meanings ascribed in my dynamic
approach are abstract objects that model the processes which Lewis () and Grice
() took to endow sentenceswith their contents. However, in taking these processes
themselves to be the meanings the dynamic approach arrives at additional semantic
resources for solving the Frege-Geach problem.6 Only further, more general, work
on metasemantics will reveal the comparative virtues of semantic and metasemantic
approaches.
 The Virtues of Dynamic Expressivism: a Sketch
Subsequent sections present dynamic expressivism and its alternatives in full technical
detail.This section offers a less formal sketch of the positions and issues with the hope
that this will bring order to thewealth of detail that is to follow. I will start with a simple
model of the role representational andmotivational states play in rational agency.Then
I will use this framework to articulate deontic expressivism and show how it leads to
the Frege-Geach problem.This will allowme to say what dynamic expressivism is and
how it is better suited to solve this problem than accounts which use the tools of truth-
conditional semantics.
According to a familiar, if limited, model of rational agency an agent’s beliefs
are modeled with a probability space and their values with a utility function. The
probability space measures how likely they take certain propositions to be and the
utility function measures how valuable they take certain states of affairs to be. Agents
make rational choices by selecting those actions that lead to outcomes with the highest
‘expected utility’: the value of an outcome weighted by how likely the agent takes it to
be. It is crucial to note that beliefs and values play quite distinct theoretical roles in
this model: agents’ decisions are primarily driven by what they value, and tempered
only by what they believe. An agent may strive for a very unlikely outcome if it is far
more valuable than the other options. Further, if they had no values they would have
5 In an earlier version of this work I adopted a semantics much closer to Veltman (, p. ) and
Portner (, p. ).The new semantics is now a bit of a hybrid between that semantics, one fromdynamic
logic (van Benthem and Liu, ) and Starr’s () dynamic semantics for imperatives.
6 This approach has much in common with Millikan (, ).
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no basis for choice, but if they had no beliefs they could still (naively) choose actions.
These different theoretical roles justify rather different assumptions about probabilities
and utilities. If an agent has credence . that Zoyd shared, then that agent is assumed
to have credence . that Zoyd didn’t share. By contrast, if Zoyd’s sharing has utility 
for an agent, it is not assumed that Zoyd’s sharing gets utility t −  where t is the total
amount of utility actions can have for the agent. The assumption for probabilities is
reasonable since they capture how the agent represents the world: in the world either
Zoyd shared or he didn’t. This assumption is not plausible for utilities because they
don’t represent the world.
Against this backdrop, an expressivist might say that utterances of Zoyd must share
express utility functions. Perhaps functions where Zoyd’s sharing is assigned a high
utility relative to some standard. In simple cases, this might serve to bring one agent’s
values in line with another’s. By contrast, the subjectivist would say that deontic
utterances of Zoyd must share express propositions about utility functions. In simple
cases, these utterances would serve primarily to align agent’s beliefs (i.e. probability
spaces).Though thismight result in agents’ aligning their values, that’s not the primary
function of deontic discourse according to the subjectivist. A third position, call it
simple naturalism, maintains with subjectivism that deontic utterances express beliefs
about the world. But it rejects that these beliefs are about utility-relative facts: they
are simple beliefs about the utility-independent world. Seeing how the Frege-Geach
problem arises in this setting will allow me to say what dynamic expressivism is and
how it differs from other accounts.
Frege (, ) famously proposed the standard explanation of how represen-
tational content behaves in a compositional way. But, less famously, Frege () also
contended that those explanations do notwork for non-representationalmeaning.The
argument was simple: themeaning of negation is exhausted by its role of turning a true
content into a false one and vice versa.This explains why any sentence and its negation
are inconsistent, i.e. cannot both be true. Here’s the problem for expressivists: if (a)
does not represent the world, then how does negating it do anything meaningful, let
alone inconsistent with (a)?
() a. Zoyd must share.
b. It’s not the case that Zoyd must share.
This is the Frege-Geach Problem, whose title reflects its application by Geach ()
to non-representational theories of moral language.7 To solve this problem, it seems
that expressivists must say what non-representational attitude (a) expresses, how the
attitude expressed by (b) is generated by negating the expression of an attitude by (a)
and what it is for two non-representational attitudes to be inconsistent. Parallel issues
arise with other connectives and explaining entailment patterns.
7 See also Schroeder (d) and references therein.
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One can see the challenge more precisely from within the simple model of rational
agency above. There is a relationship between a rational agent’s credence in Zoyd
shared and Zoyd didn’t share: no credence should be assigned to the possibility of
both being true. This, as mentioned above, follows from background assumptions
about truth, representation and the functional role of beliefs—more on that in §.
It is less obvious that such a relationship exists between how much a rational agent
values Zoyd sharing and how much they value Zoyd not sharing. One can certainly
imagine a scenario where both outcomes have a high utility for the agent. Further, the
relationship between how an agent values Zoyd sharing and how they value Zoyd not
sharing speaks to the consistency of (a) and (b), rather than (a) and (b).8
() a. Zoyd must share.
b. Zoyd must not share.
Although (b) intuitively entails (b), the opposite is not true. Note that it is only
consistent to follow up (b) with but Zoyd may share. This leads to an important
observation: there are really two ‘negation problems’ for the expressivist. Suppose one
can successfully analyze (a) and (b) as expressing ‘motivationally conflicted’ values:
being in favor of sharing and being in favor of not sharing.This would be a solution to
the internal negation problem. Since one can endorse (b) without endorsing (b), an
analysis of (b) is still needed. This leaves open the possibility that a different account
of the conflict between (a) and (b) will be needed. Call this the external negation
problem. I believe the two problems require different solutions. While this point will
be argued for more precisely later, the basic idea can be articulated with the resources
currently on hand. It will then serve as a basis for contrasting dynamic expressivism
with others (Gibbard, ; Dreier, ; Yalcin, , ; Silk, ).
Even if (a) and (b) express motivationally conflicted states of mind, it is hard
to see how the same is true of (a) and (b). Initially, this is because it is hard to see
how a sentence with external negation expresses a particular motivational attitude at
all. If one thinks of Zoyd must share as serving to instill pro-sharing utilities in the
hearer, then It is not true that Zoyd must share rejects instilling those utilities. But
what particular utilities does this rejection promote? I believe that focusing on this
question gets to the heart of the problem for expressivists. Previous attempts to say
what attitude is expressed have failed to render (a) and (b) inconsistent in a way that
is clearly non-representational.
Gibbard (, pp. –) offers the following expressivist model:
() a. ‘You must share’ expresses: Agreeing with sharing
b. ‘You must not share’ expresses: Disagreeing with sharing
c. ‘It is not the case that you must share’ expresses: Disagreeing with agreeing
with sharing
8 Unwin () highlights the importance of this distinction in the context of expressivism.
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Thismodel does not say anythingmore about what disagreeing and agreeing arewhich
explains why agreeing with X and disagreeing with X are in rational tension. In the
setting above, this amounts to saying that You must share and It is not the case that you
must share express conflicting utility functions without saying what utility functions
these are and how exactly those functions or their acceptance conflict. Some have
worried whether such a semantic theory is adequately explanatory (e.g. Schroeder,
a, d). § will press that concern in another way by arguing that expressivists
need to offer a positive account of how expressive communication works and how
it differs from representational communication. It is hard to see how this could work
without characterizing representational and expressive communication as importantly
different processes.
Building on Dreier (, ), Silk () develops what might be called prefer-
ence expressivism, which formulates a deontic semantics in terms of preference order-
ings. In Starr () I pursue roughly the same strategy to explain the incompatibility
of contrary imperatives such asDance! andDon’t dance!, without assuming that imper-
atives are representational. This aims to fill the gaps in Gibbard’s approach. The basic
idea is that deontic sentences express preferences. Much like utilities, the function of
preferences is tomotivate choice.9 Crucially, thismeans that preferences which prevent
a choice will be dysfunctional. The idea is then that two deontic sentences can be
inconsistent if they express preferences which, taken together, are dysfunctional in this
way. A theory along these lines offers an interesting expressivist solution of the internal
negation problem. But I do not think it can solve the external negation problem.
A (strict) preference for you sharing could be modeled as an ordering which ranks
any world w where you share over every world w where you don’t: w  w. Now,
consider a semantics on which:
() a. ‘You must share’ expresses: w  w
b. ‘You must not share’ expresses: w  w
For now, set aside how the meaning for (b) is determined from the meaning of (a)
and a semantics for negation. Here is how one might explain the inconsistency of
these two sentences on such a semantics.10 The first step is to determine what it is to
take these two preference orderings ‘together’.Unioning them into a bigger preference
ordering is the most natural idea: w  w,w  w.11 It is a platitude about
choice that you shouldn’t choose A if you strictly prefer B to A and you can choose B
9 The earlier utility expressivist proposal was that Must(A) expresses utility functions which assign a
utility to A-worlds that is high according to some standard. By contrast, preference expressivism says: the
utility of A-worlds is greater than the utility of ¬A-worlds.
10 Neither Dreier (, ) nor Silk () explicitly formulates the decision-theoretic constraints on
preference and choice that they take to constitute preferential coherence. Following Starr (), I assume in
themain text above a non-dominance principle about choice and tie this to the need for acyclic preferences.
I do not know whether this is what Dreier (, ) and Silk () had in mind.
11 Note that  is the set {〈w ,w〉} and  is the set {〈w,w〉}. The fact that union is the operation
appropriate to combining preferences is discussed by van Benthem and Liu (). This is fairly clear from
thinking about how to combine the orderings fromMust(A) andMust(B). Intersection predicts thatA ∧ B-
worlds,¬A ∧ B-worlds and A ∧ ¬B-worlds are best, while union predicts that only A ∧ B-worlds are best.
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instead.Thismeans that any cyclic strict preference ordering is irrational. Something is
preferred to every alternative, so no alternative can be rationally chosen.This is exactly
the situation in. Since it fails tomotivate a choice, it ismotivationally defective.This
seems like exactly the kind of explanation of inconsistency that expressivists seek. But,
I claim, it does not work for the external negation problem.
Following standard accounts of modality, Silk () proposes that Must(A)
requires all the most preferred worlds to be A-worlds, while¬Must(A) requires some
of the most preferred worlds to be ¬A-worlds. The issue is that taking together—
unioning—two preference orderings that meet these respective descriptions does not
always yield a dysfunctional one. To illustrate this, consider a model in which we
are concerned only with A and B worlds. Using a capital letter to indicate truth
and a lowercase letter for falsity, Must(A) can express an ordering such as  while
¬Must(A) can express an ordering such as : wAB and wAb are the most preferred
worlds according to, andwaB is among the most preferred worlds according to.
As the graphs illustrate, there is nothing dysfunctional about taking these preferences
together. Together, theywillmotivate the agent to choosewAB orwAb.These combined
preferences are not motivationally dysfunctional.
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
AB
aB
Ab
ab
  1
Must(A)
  2
¬Must(A)
1 ∪ 2
From the dynamic perspective, the preference expressivist went wrong in two
assumptions: (i) accepting ¬Must(A) is the same kind of process as accepting
Must(A) and (ii) consistency is a relationship between contents rather than processes.
On the dynamic account developed in §, the meaning of an expressive sentence is
characterized in terms of how accepting it changes a preference ordering. Must(A)
introduces a strict preference for all live A-worlds over ¬A-worlds, and tests that
doing so makes A a practical necessity: all the choices it motivates result in A-worlds.
(The success of this test will depend on which preferences have been previously
introduced.) ¬Must(A), on the other hand, does not introduce a preference at all,
so its inconsistency with Must(A) is not an inconsistency of preference. ¬Must(A)
changes a preference ordering by removing any preferences that would be added by
Must(A). Must(A) and ¬Must(A) are dynamically inconsistent: since one sentence
adds what the other removes there is no ordering which contains the effects both have
on a preference ordering. But that is crucially different from saying that they lead to
orderings which, combined in the standard way, are rationally defective.Must(A) and
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¬Must(A) are inconsistent in the same way that certain actions are. Consider a robot
that rolls around a bar to each table. It fills an empty shot glass with vodka and it
vacuums up the contents of non-empty shot glasses. Then it cruises on. The action of
pouring a shot and the action of vacuuming one are incompatible in the sense that no
state of a given glass that directly results from the robot’s actions contains the effects of
both actions. But this is not because the effects themselves are incompatible: the empty
space in the shot glass and the shot of vodka are clearly compatible in that one can fill
the other. As will be discussed, a non-dynamic account does not make room for the
idea that φ and¬φ have radically different communicative effects. On a non-dynamic
account, negation takes one content (e.g. preference-ordering or proposition) and
yields another of the same kind. Their communicative effects are modeled by a single
pragmatic process which combines contents of that kind (the previously accepted
contents incremented with the new content).
The dynamic approach to the external negation problem combines elegantly with
the preference expressivists’ approach to the internal negation problem. In §, I define
dynamic preferential inconsistency as follows: φ andψ are dynamically preferentially
inconsistent just in case there is no single practically rational preference ordering that
contains the effects on preferences that both would have. In the case of Must(A)
and Must(¬A), there exists a preference ordering that contains preferences both
introduce, but it is irrational because those preferences are cyclic. Must(A) and
¬Must(A) are different: there is no preference ordering which contains the effects on
preferences that each sentence produces. If an ordering has the preferencesMust(A)
adds, then updating with ¬Must(A) would remove them. If an ordering lacks the
preferences ¬Must(A) would remove, then updating withMust(A) would add them.
Formalizing the dynamic account requires a logic of actions rather than contents,
one which speaks to questions of how connectives combine actions and how actions
can bear logical relations to each other. Fortunately, logics of this kind—called dynamic
logics (Harel et al., )—have been extensively developed in computer science and
have inspired new semantic approaches to natural language (Heim, ; Kamp, ;
Groenendijk et al., ). The basic idea of this approach is to formally describe how
accepting each type of sentence changes an agent’s state of mind. Surprisingly, one can
reformulate classical logic in this way and then add non-classical operators to produce
operations that do not amount to operations on content (§). Hence, this is not an
alternative approach to semantics, but a more general one. By importing the dynamic
semantics for disjunction from Starr () below, I will also be able to navigate a chal-
lenge presented by Schroeder () for previous dynamic analyses and analyses such
as Yalcin’s (, ): they incorrectly predict that believing Must(A) ∨ B entails
either believing Must(A) or believing B.12 As I will emphasize, parallel observations
hold for what disjunctions communicate. This connection between an expressivist
12 Schroeder () makes a more general observation: this prediction holds even if both disjuncts are
expressive. The semantics in § also blocks this result.
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account of communication and solving the negation and disjunction problems is
surprising. As I’ve argued above, solving the negation problem requiresMust(A) and
¬Must(A) to do very different communicative jobs. This is unlike A and ¬A, so
it seems to follow that the viability of expressivism relies crucially on the idea that
expressive communication works differently to representational communication. In
the following section, I argue that the need for a distinctive expressivist model of
communication follows from more general features of the expressivist program. This
will also allow me to consider what is distinctive about expressive communication.
 Expressivism and Communication
Philosophers who maintain that some bit of discourse does not work by describing
distinctions in the world often rally under the label expressivism, while those who
disagree rally under descriptivism. Defining expressivism could easily occupy a chapter
of its own, so I will not authoritatively impose such a definition on the discussion here.
Instead, I wish to consider three characteristic expressivist theses:13
Expressivist Theses
. Communication: ‘To express a state ofmind is not to say that one is in it’ (Gibbard,
, p. ).
. Explanation: ‘The semantic properties of sentences are to be explained, funda-
mentally, in terms of properties of the attitudes conventionally expressed by
utterances of those sentences’ (Silk, , §).
. Non-representation: The states of mind expressed by sentences are non-
representational, and, more specifically, motivational.
As suggested above, the point of the explanatory thesis is to replace distinctions ‘in the
world’ with psychological distinctions, all while keeping the subject matter of deontic
discourse non-psychological. Viewed in this light, a surprising fact becomes apparent:
the explanatory expressivist thesis assumes the one about communication. Suppose
the communication thesis did not hold, and consider whether the explanatory one
could. Without the communication thesis, expressing one’s preference for sharing is
to describe oneself as preferring sharing. Then one’s attitude of preference is involved
in the same way as books are involved in the sentence Books are made from paper.
The semantic fact that You must share and You must not share are inconsistent is no
more explained by the properties of your preferences than the parallel inconsistency
betweenBooks aremade from paper andBooks are notmade from paper is explained by
the properties of books. In both cases, one needs things around—books, preferences—
and distinctions between them. So vindicating the explanation thesis is at best a partial
13 The quotation from Silk (, §) nicely captures the operative expressivist thesis at play in much
recent work including Gibbard (, p. ), Schroeder (c, p. ) and Dreier (, , p. ).
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vindication of expressivism. Contemporary expressivists have done little to meet this
other important objective.14
As summarized in §, the account of Gibbard () declines to positively char-
acterize the content of ¬Must(A). But without such a characterization, it is not
possible to positively characterize how an agent’s state ofmind changes when someone
communicates¬Must(A) to them.What are the prospects for supplementing analyses
such as those found in Gibbard () and Silk () with an expressivist pragmatics
that clearly distinguishes expressing attitudes from expressing representational con-
tents about those attitudes? Yalcin (, §) and Silk () propose similar deontic
semantics and Yalcin (, §) sketches an expressivist pragmatics for his account.
On that account, expressive communication works in a way that is formally parallel
to representational communication. § will present a challenge for this account.
As suggested in §, to solve the negation problem one must reject the idea that
expressive sentences convey content in the same way as representational sentences.
This is becausemotivational contents combine and conflict in different ways than their
representational counterparts. But that suggests that a model which fits the expression
ofmotivational attitudes into the representationalmodel is not themodel expressivists
need. It ismore naturally interpreted as amodel of how one conveys information about
motivational attitudes.This is no accident, I claim. On a robust representational inter-
pretation of truth-conditional semantics, there is an essential reliance on reference.
All contents are therefore abstractions of referential relations. This means that one
cannot employ a robust interpretation of truth-conditional semantics, and use truth-
conditional semantics to either solve the Frege-Geach problem or give an expressivist
theory of communication.
Although the expressivist communication thesis is my focus, a word about the
explanatory thesis is in order.15 It is hard to say whether that thesis applies to the view
offered here since this view does not proceed by assigning sentences to the attitudes,
or states of mind, they express. Further, the semantic properties of all sentences could
be said to be explained in terms of properties of the mental states they update. For
example, in one sense of inconsistency, the inconsistency of two descriptive sentences is
explained by the fact that an updatewith both leads to a state ofmindwhose function is
to represent the world, but fails to do so.16 The inconsistency of two expressive deontic
sentences is ultimately explained by the fact that an update with both requires a state
of preference whose function is to motivate agents to choose one option over another,
but fails to do so. One can recover something in the vicinity of the explanatory thesis
14 Schroeder (b) also highlights this gap and explores several expressivist accounts of ‘expression’
which pair a sentence with the attitude it expresses.The expressivist accounts I’ll consider, like Yalcin (),
do not make use of such a pairing, and focus on the interpersonal relation of communication rather than
the individualistic notion of expression. So while Schroeder (b) makes important and related points,
its criticism is complementary to that presented here.
15 See also Silk () and Charlow () who discuss the explanatory thesis.
16 I will say more about what I take ‘explaining inconsistency’ to be in §.
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by replacing talk of sentences expressing mental states with updating mental states,
and focusing on explanations which appeal to the non-representational dimensions
of those states (e.g. attention, preference).
Dynamic Expressivist Explanatory Thesis Semantic properties of expressive
sentences are explained, fundamentally, in terms of the way they update non-
representational dimensions of language users’ mental states.
I’ve said a bit above about why expressivism is a thesis worthy of attention in
metaethics, but I think it is also important to say why it is worthy of attention in the
study of natural language meaning.
Expressivism may seem like an esoteric philosophical doctrine, but its communi-
cation thesis is familiar from commonsense observations. Suppose we’re looking at
the same field of wild flowers. I’ve noticed a bee fly on a nearby wild flower and I’m
attending to it. I point at it and say, that’s what a bee fly looks like. I was attending
to the bee fly and you are now attending to the bee fly. I’ve communicated my state
of attention to you. But I did not do so by referring to my state of attention and
stating a fact about it, i.e. I did not say something like My state of attention is thus-
and-so. The way I communicated my state of attention was very different than the way
I communicated the object of my attention, to which I referred with a gesture. Further,
one can imagine two agents’ having identical visual representations of a scene but their
attention to be centered on different objects. Since such a difference is likely to impact
actions where they coordinate, it seems that successful communication will involve
agents attuning their state of attention, despite the fact that they are not referring
to those states and talking about them. Indeed, given that agents seem capable of
communicating certain features of their mental states without even being aware of
them, expressivism in these domains seems inevitable. Attention, of course, is not the
only expressive dimension where this difference seems to matter. When I tell you
that bee flies lay their eggs in beetle nests and that after hatching their larvae feed
on their hosts’ eggs, youmight express disgust at this parasitismwith a grimace. You’ve
thereby communicated your disgust tome.17 But you did not do so by referring to your
state of disgust and stating a fact about it. You did not say anything like My state of
disgust is thus-and-so. Nothing in your facial expression seems to have brought your
affective state into the conversation in the way my pointing brought the bee fly into
the conversation, nor does anything in your facial expression describe your affective
state. These two examples illustrate the expressivist communication thesis at work in
a more general setting. In these cases it seems plausible enough. But neither example
involved essentially deontic language, or language at all: gestures were the expressive
17 Add to the story that I intended to do so if you are inclined to the Gricean orthodoxy that requires
an effect to be intended for it to be communicated. Note that the cost of such orthodoxy is positing a
higher-order mental state which involves the speaker attending to their state of attention. Expressivism
is naturally allied with the various attempts to do without the Gricean intellectualization of communication
and convention (e.g. Burge, ).
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signals.Thus, an expressivist must say how this kind of communication operates in the
linguistic realm in general, and the deontic realm in particular. Note, however, that it is
not problematic for the expressivist to admit that deontic discourse does not appear to
be psychological. On an expressivist view, psychological states are behind the scene but
not on stage. In fact this is likely another advantage to be celebrated by the expressivist.
The proper characterization of the psychological states relevant to the interpretation
of modals requires theoretical sophistication beyond our everyday grasp of our own
minds, e.g. orderings or probability spaces.
I will now proceed by presenting an entirely standard truth-conditional semantics
for propositional logic and highlighting how its approach to logic, compositionality
and communication depends on reference (§). I then critically examine attempts to
use an extension of this framework to solve the negation problem and to provide an
expressivist account of communication in §.That discussion will propel us towards a
dynamics semantics. I will first present a dynamic semantics for propositional logic to
illustrate the basic ways in which it departs from classical semantics (§). I will then,
in §, provide a dynamic semantics for deontic discourse and explain how dynamic
expressivism tackles the difficulties for other approaches.
 Logical Semantics, Classically
Logical semantics has provided a model of linguistic meaning that is useful in three
ways. First, it accounts for how the meanings of complex sentences are built up from
the meanings of their parts. Secondly, it provides an account of why some sentences
follow from others and why some are inconsistent with others. Thirdly, it provides an
account of the basic information communicated by any use of the sentence. All three
of these applications rely on exclusively referential semantic concepts.That is, they rely
on the idea that linguistic expressions function by referring to andmaking distinctions
between things in the world. To be concrete but keep the formalism simple, I will
illustrate this with an intensional (possible-worlds) semantics for a propositional
logic.
In intensional logical semantics the meaning of a sentence is usually modeled as
a set of possible worlds, namely the ways the world could be if the sentence is true.
Call such a set a proposition.18 The aim of a compositional semantics is then to assign
each sentence φ to a proposition, [[φ]]. But before turning to those details, consider the
more intuitive and pertinent account of communication built on this semantics. An
idealized but usefulmodel of how representational language is used to communicate is
familiar from Stalnaker (, ): it provides information by excluding possibilities.
One agent has some information they want to convey to another.This information can
be thought of as ruling out some possibilitiesw, . . . ,wn.The first agent can then utter
18 This would be more clear in a first-order system where the ‘referent’ of an atomic sentence is
determined by the referents of its terms and predicate. But that would introduce unnecessary complexities.
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a sentence φ that excludes those possibilities, i.e.w, . . . ,wn /∈ [[φ]], and by combining
this information with theirs i, the second agent can rule out some possibilities, i.e. i ∩
[[φ]].The important part is that on this view, gaining information amounts to pointing
to some ways the world could be and saying that the world isn’t those ways. Or, to use
the exact phrasing from earlier: it refers to a distinction, say p or ¬p, and describes
the world as being on one side of that distinction. An expressivist cannot endorse this
account. After all, they hold that deontic discourse communicates those states of mind
without referring to them.
The compositional semantics employs a space W of possible worlds. Though a
simplification, one can equate a possible worldwith an atomic valuation, i.e. a function
assigning exactly one truth value (, ) to every atomic sentence—thinking of a truth-
table containing a column for every atomic sentence, each row specifies a possible
world.19 Atomics then denote the set of worlds where they are true, and the Boolean
connectives are treated as complementation, intersection and union, respectively.
Definition  (Compositional Semantics).
() [[p]] = {w ∈ W | w(p) = } () [[¬φ]] = W − [[φ]]
() [[φ ∧ ψ]] = [[φ]] ∩ [[ψ]] () [[φ ∨ ψ]] = [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]
What is the intuitive picture of meaning behind this formalism? An atomic sentence
p points to a region of logical space by referring to a particular distinction between
worlds, w(p) =  or w(p) = , and describing that world as being a certain way:
w(p) = . Connectives make it possible to point to regions of logical space that lone
atomic sentences cannot reach. In this framework, the only way for the language to
express distinctions between psychological states is for it to refer to them. The basic
notion of meaning at work is thoroughly referential, whether one is talking about a
sentence pointing at a region of logical space or whether one is talking about the
distinctions between worlds that make that possible. The compositional semantics
for the connectives is not really separable from this representational function. If one
introduced operators that did something non-referential, Definition  would provide
no clue what Boolean combinations would mean—that was Frege’s () point.
This makes it clear how non-trivial it is to add an operator with a non-referential
function to this framework.This compounds the challenge for an expressivist account
of communication. If distinctions between mental states are tracked compositionally
in the fashion of Definition , then they must be treated exactly like the distinctions
that are being referred to.Thismakes it very hard to see howone can take a content [[φ]]
and separate those distinctions that are being referred to and those that are not. It is this
tension that I will develop into a more detailed criticism of pragmatic expressivism.
Before developing that criticism, I will turn to logical relations.
19 This allows me to compress the distinction between worlds and models, or between ways the world
could be and ways the atomic expressions could refer.
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The standard definitions of logical relations also rely essentially on reference, though
that is less than clear on a first pass.20
Definition  (Consequence).
φ, . . . ,φn  ψ ⇔ ([[φ]] ∩ · · · ∩ [[φn]]) ⊆ [[ψ]]
Definition  (Consistency).
φ, . . . ,φn are consistent ⇔ ([[φ]] ∩ · · · ∩ [[φn]]) = Ø
On the referential picture of meaning sentences point to regions of logical space
by pointing at some distinction between possible worlds and describing the points
in the space as being on a particular side of that distinction. The consequence
relation requires φ, . . . ,φn to collectively point to a subregion of what [[ψ]] points
to. This means that the distinctions made by φ, . . . ,φn guarantee that the distinction
made by [[ψ]] has already been made. Similarly, consequence requires that φ, . . . ,φn
collectively point to a non-empty region.Thismeans that the distinctions they describe
can be satisfied by at least one world.
As before, there is a difficulty for an expressivist who would like to assign ameaning
[[φ]] which expresses psychological states without referring to them. Because both
definitions are entirely moored in the referential framework, it is simply unclear what
they would mean when extended to a variety of non-referential meaning. Consider
consistency. If one isn’t trying to refer to distinctions inworlds is it actually problematic
if there is not a world which bears all those distinctions simultaneously? This draws
out a feature that will be important below, and is often suppressed in discussions about
what an expressivistmust do to explain the inconsistency of expressive sentences. Even
in entirely standard truth-conditional semantics, there is a teleological dimension to
the explanations of logical relations.
One might think that if an expressivist could assign denotations to non-referential
expressive sentences, then Definition  could be simply applied to them. However,
such a minimal answer is arguably unsatisfactory even for non-expressive sentences.
When one seeks an explanation ofA and¬A’s inconsistency, one oftenwants an expla-
nation of why an agent cannot believe/assert both without changing theirmind and an
explanation of why two agents which believe/assert these contraries are disagreeing.
Simply saying that the denotation of the two sentences has an empty overlap does
not fully address this question.What is wrongwith simultaneously asserting/believing
sentenceswhose denotations have an empty overlap?Answering this question requires
saying something about what denotation, assertion and belief are such that empty
overlap results in some kind of rational tension for an agent. For example, one might
maintain that the function of belief and assertion is to represent the world (Stalnaker,
, ), and the denotation of a sentence captures how it represents the world to
be. Then, semantically inconsistent sentences represent the world as being some way
20 Geach () stresses the difficulty of capturing inferences involving expressive sentences.
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no world can be, so they are dysfunctional things to simultaneously believe or assert.
This explanation combines three resources.
Explaining Inconsistency Representational explanations of inconsistency explain
the defective nature of simultaneously believing/asserting two sentences by:
. Construing the denotation relation as the representation relation
. Construing the function of asserting/believing those sentences as representing
the world
. A definition of semantic consistency as empty overlap, and an explanation of why
that tracks dysfunctional assertions/beliefs.
Agreement and disagreement can then be thought of as consistency between the
beliefs/assertions of two agents. This broader understanding of what it means to
explain inconsistency clarifies both the challenge and prospects for an expressivist.
The prospect is clear: they need an alternative conception of the denotation rela-
tion, a different construal of the function sentences serve, a formal definition of
consistency and an explanation of how that formal definition tracks dysfunctional
assertions/beliefs.21 Now for the challenge. The expressivist can semantically treat
the sensitivity to psychological states exactly as one would treat referential discourse,
but then they will face two challenges. They must have a different account of why
empty overlaps in denotation are bad, since they believe the function of expressive
discourse is non-representational. Indeed, it seems that anything in the neighborhood
of the explanatory expressivist thesis commits them to appealing here in an essential
way to the non-representational attitudes that are supposed to explain the semantic
properties of expressive sentences. Additionally, the expressivistmust explain how that
meaning, which is formally modeled with means suited to representational meaning,
is used in a non-representational form of communication. In the next section I will
argue that recent expressivist analyses (Silk, ; Yalcin, , , ) appear to
explain inconsistency, but it is not actually clear that they meet the first challenge.
Further, I will argue that they do not meet the second.
 Preference Expressivism and Pragmatic Expressivism
Silk (, p. ) and Yalcin (, §) offer quite similar semantic analyses of deontic
modals, both of which resemble the account of expressive content sketched byGibbard
21 Charlow () construes explaining consistency more narrowly: deriving a contradiction in the
meta-language from the assumption that the sentences are jointly true/satisfied. Charlow (, §.) argues
that a psychologist semantics is not entitled to assume in such a derivation that irrational psychological
states do not exist, since they are logically possible. I’m taking a broader view here, which begins with the
fact that content is functionally grounded. Setting aside which approach is better, note that an account like
the above can happily admit the existence of irrational states of mind and still explain inconsistencies. They
are essential to that explanation!
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().22 Both approaches adopt a truth-conditional semantics, but one with a format
that is different from the above: it assigns a sentence to a truth-value relative to a world
w and, crucially, a practical parameter. For Silk (), the practical parameter  is a
weak-preference (pre)ordering (reflexive, transitive) on possible worlds, i.e. w  w
means w is preferred at least as much as w, and when w  w also holds w and
w are equally preferred. Yalcin (, §) stays closer to Gibbard (), and uses
‘hyperplans’.23 I’ll focus on Silk’s () semantics, since it will be closer to the view
I develop later. Both analyses follow Gibbard () in proposing truth-conditions
that do not place any constraint on the world parameter, only the practical parameter.
For Silk (), this means placing a constraint only on the  parameter: there is
no mention of the world of evaluation w on the right-hand side of the semantic
clauses. Deontic modals constrain  by requiring something of the worlds that are
best according to, i.e. worlds that are at least as preferable as every other world.
Definition  (Preference Expressivism, Silk , ).
Where Best() = {w | ∀w′:w  w′ if w′  w}:
. [[Must(φ)]]w, =  ⇐⇒ ∀w′ ∈ Best(): [[φ]]w′ , = 
• Must(φ) is true at w, iff all the worlds best according to are φ-worlds.
. [[May(φ)]]w, =  ⇐⇒ ∃w′ ∈ Best(): [[φ]]w′ , = 
• May(φ) is true at w, iff some world best according to is a φ-world.
This semantics predicts thatMust(A) and ¬Must(A) cannot both be true. Given the
standard semantics for negation, 24 the truth of bothMust(A) and¬Must(A) requires:
∀w′ ∈ Best(): [[A]]w′ , =  and ∃w′ ∈ Best(): [[A]]w′ , = . In words, the truth
of both requires all-best worlds to be A-worlds and some-best world to be a¬A-
world. There is no set of worlds, let alone one generated from , that satisfies that
requirement. This semantics clearly predicts the inconsistency of contrary expressive
sentences. But does it predict it in a way that the expressivist can endorse? Silk moves
quickly here, contending that it does:
In response to the negation problem, we can say that must and not must are inconsistent
because their conjunction expresses an incoherent set of weak preferences. It is incoherent
to have all of one’s most weakly preferred alternatives be ones where [A] and some of one’s
most weakly preferred alternatives be ones where [¬A]. There is no (non-empty) preorder that
22 I am tempted, but hesitant, to categorize the account proposed by Charlow (, ) along with
the pragmatic expressivists. The view developed there has a more nuanced and developed metasemantics
that make this categorization unclear. How exactly the points made in this section relate to these voices will
have to be left for another day.
23 Unlike Gibbard (), Yalcin (, §) constructs each hyperplan h out of possibilia: h is a function
that maps a set of worlds s to one of its subsets, namely those worlds permissible according to the hyperplan
given that one is in circumstances s.
24 [[¬φ]]w, =  ⇐⇒ [[φ]]w, = 
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represents such a body of preferences. Preferential incoherence appears to be the right kind of
inconsistency in attitude to explain the inconsistency between normative sentences ‘φ’ and ‘¬φ’.
(Silk, , )
The key idea is that the two sentences express preferences that are incoherent. It is
crucial for the expressivist that this incoherence is non-representational.This is where
I think there is room for skepticism. The kinds of non-representational coherence
constraints placed on preferences are like the one discussed in §: no cyclic orderings.
That is because such orderings exist and would fail to motivate choice. There is no
parallel coherence constraint on preferences in decision theory that says one cannot
have all of one’s most weakly preferred alternatives be ones where A and some of
one’s most weakly preferred alternatives be ones where ¬A. It’s not that there is a
preference ordering which does have these two properties but would fail to motivate
choice. It’s that no preference orderingmeets the two descriptions at all. It is nomore a
practical constraint on preference orderings than the fact that they cannot both range
over ten alternatives and twelve alternatives. The nonexistence of such a preference
ordering does not follow from any background theory about howpreferencemotivates
choice, but from the fact that they are inconsistent ways of representing preferences.
More generally, if there is a genuine appeal to preferential incoherence and not
representational inconsistency here, then one should be able to construct an ordering
which has these two properties and show how it fails to motivate choice. Since the
descriptions are logically incompatible, I do not see how this is possible.
Another way of illustrating the problem here is to return to the observations of
§. There I motivated the idea that the natural way to combine preferences is to
union them.Thismeans that themotivational consistency of two preference orderings
amounts to whether their union can serve its function of motivating choices. Now,
consider two orderings  and  over one A-world w and one ¬A-world w.
Suppose then that w  w and w w, while the other ordering is just the
opposite: w  w and w w. Must(A) then expresses  while ¬Must(A)
expresses . If the two orderings are combined into one, call it , a perfectly
rational ordering results where one is indifferent between A and ¬A: w  w
and w  w. Indeed, since  is also expressed by Must(¬A) the same problem
arises for explaining the rational tension produced by committing oneself to both
Must(A) andMust(¬A). 25 Yet, is a perfectly rational state of preference.There are
no background decision-theoretic principles the preference expressivist can appeal to
here to render this ordering incoherent.There is, however, an important lesson one can
take away from this discussion. Solving the external negation problem by appealing to
incoherent preferences may not be possible.
25 To some degree, this latter point is a bug of Silk’s formalization using weak preferences. Weak
preferences are ill-suited to the job here because it is impossible to distinguish between an irrational
symmetric strict preference and indifference when you take weak preference as basic and define strict
preference as an asymmetric preference. For this reason, I use strict preferences in §.
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Let me now turn to the question of how deontic modals with the semantics in
Definition  could be used to communicate preferences without referring to them
and describing them, i.e. representing them. This is where Yalcin (, §) makes a
valuable proposal.26 Beginning with the dynamics of language use, the view is that the
common ground of a conversation consists not just of mutually supposed information
s = {w, . . . ,wn, . . .} but also a set of preferences P = {, . . . ,n, . . .} (Yalcin, ,
p. ).While descriptive discourse constrains the world and eliminates worlds from s,
deontic language constrains preferences and eliminates preference orderings from P.
In brief: each type of sentence affects the common ground in a different way.27 Since
s is a representational state and P is a motivational state this distinction appears apt
for distinguishing representational frommotivational discourse. Yalcin’s (, p. )
sketch suggests a formalization in the following territory:28
Pragmatic Expressivist Discourse Model
. A descriptive sentence φ expresses a constraint on how the world can be, i.e. the
set of left-indices that make it true: 〈〈φ 〈〈 = {w | ∃: [[φ]]w, = }
. An expressive deontic sentence φ expresses a constraint on preferences, i.e. the
set of right-indices that make it true: 〉〉φ〉〉 = { | ∃w: [[φ]]w, = }
. Common ground: C = 〈sC,PC〉, where sC = {w, . . . ,wn},PC = {, . . . ,m}
• Background assumption: sC is the ways the world could be given what the
agents are taking for granted
• Background assumption: PC is the preferences compatible with the situations
the agents’ are in favor of
. Representational communication: C  φ = 〈sC ∩ 〈〈φ 〈〈,PC〉
. Expressive communication: C  φ = 〈sC,PC ∩ 〉〉φ〉〉〉
How does this allow one to distinguish referring to and describing preferences
from expressing preferences? The idea seems to be that referring to and describ-
ing preferences eliminate worlds while expressing preferences eliminates orderings.
The problem is that this interpretation of the model is entirely optional. Since the
dynamics of expressive and representational content are identical, the system could
be reformulated in terms of updating a set of world-ordering pairs, or centered-
worlds, which distinguishways theworld could be from the perspective of a preference
ordering. Then one can easily describe the system as behaving as referring to and
describing preferences, just as worlds centering on individuals are said to refer to and
describe an individual (Egan, ). The only way to clearly distinguish expressive
26 See Rothschild (); Swanson (forthcoming); and Moss () for related work. Ninan ()
presents a view that is ambivalent between semantic and pragmatic expressivism. The examination of
pragmatic expressivism through examining embeddedmust claims is a strategy Ninan (, §.) already
highlights as an important way to probe these views. See note  in § for more discussion of Ninan ().
27 The terminology of expressing constraints comes from Swanson (; forthcoming).
28 The notation of 〈〈φ 〈〈 and 〉〉φ〉〉 is novel here, but iconic: [[φ]] is a set of pairs 〈w,〉 while 〈〈φ 〈〈 is the
set of left members (worlds) and 〉〉φ〉〉 is the set of right members (orderings).
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from representational communication is tomotivate and adopt amodel where the two
kinds of discourse have clearly different dynamics, say one where expressive sentences
do not refer to orderings and place constraints on them. It is hard to see how one can
do this without departing from truth-conditional semantics. As discussed above, this
difference also seems necessary for a solution to the negation problem. It turns out
there is a rather similar issue with disjunction.
Mixed disjunctions provide a hard challenge for the expressivist approach above.
It is hard to see how they can be explained while maintaining that expressive and
representational communication have distinct communicative effects.The challenge is
related to Schroeder’s () concerns about mixed disjunctions in belief ascriptions.
But my focus will be on what mixed disjunctions communicate.29 Suppose you know
that exactly two things make Alex happy, namely Pat being in town or Alex receiving
permission to skateboard, and I askWhy is Alex happy? you might answer:
() Either Pat is in town or Alex may skateboard.
Consider how this sentence would update the common ground on the pragmatic
expressivist model above. The standard semantics for disjunction gives us the follow-
ing truth-conditions and corresponding constraints:
() [[P]]w, =  or [[May(S)]]w, = 
() 〈〈P ∨ May(S)〈〈 = {w | ∃: [[P]]w, =  or [[May(S)]]w, = }
() 〉〉P ∨ May(S)〉〉 = { | ∃w: [[P]]w, =  or [[May(S)]]w, = }
Theproblem for the world constraint is that the deontic disjunct will allow every world
to meet this condition. There is a preference ordering that makesMay(S) true and if
one world-ordering pair featuring that ordering makes it true, then any other pair
with that ordering makes it true: deontics do not constrain the world parameter. The
same problem arises for the preference constraint, since there is a world that makes
P true and P does not constrain the ordering parameter. This predicts that a mixed
disjunction cannot communicate anything, contrary to our intuitions about ().30
There is an alternative analysis of disjunction that pragmatic expressivists could
adopt to capture this data. Suppose we took common grounds to be sets of the old
common grounds: C = {〈s,P〉, . . .}. For any non-disjunctive sentence, proceed as
before, only applying the update to each information state or preference set. But for
disjunctions, don’t use truth conditions, but rather perform a special update process.
Take the result of updating C with the left disjunct and union it with the result of
29 Mixed disjunctions are a focal point in the arguments I’ve offered for dynamic analyses of imperatives
(Starr, , ).
30 Silk (, §) offers a modified semantics designed to solve Schroeder’s () disjunction problem.
But this results in practical sentences that constrain the world parameter and hence update S, and
representational ones that constrain the preference parameter and hence update the preference set. This
solves the problem at the expense of having a way of neatly distinguishing expressive from representational
communication.
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updating with the right disjunct. To illustrate how that would work, consider a simple
common ground where there is one pair: C = {〈{w,w}, {,}〉}. Suppose w
is a P-world, w is a ¬P-world,  makes May(S) true and  makes May(S)
false. Then updating with () will produce C′ = {〈{w}, {,}〉, 〈{w,w}, {}〉}.
We may interpret these new common grounds as ‘imprecise common grounds’, on
analogy with imprecise credences. The agents’ states of mind are not precise enough
to distinguish which state they are in.31 This revised analysis can be interpreted in
two ways. Perhaps disjunction does not have a truth-conditional semantics, but only
a distinctive pragmatic update rule that is different from that which applies to every
other kind of sentence. This assumption conflicts with the received methodology of
semantics and pragmatics. No connective has only a pragmatics. It does, however,
suggest a more radical approach: what if all sentence forms were given update rules as
their semantics? This more radical approach is simply dynamic semantics, and will be
pursued in the next section.
 Logical Semantics, Dynamically
On a dynamic semantics, the meaning of a sentence can be modeled as a function [φ]
which specifies how accepting it transforms an agent’s state of mind s into another s′.
One specifies the semantics with equations such as s[φ] = s′, which say how applying
[φ] to s results in some other state s′. Since meaning resides in how sentences change
states, it is said to be dynamic. By contrast, truth-conditional semantics is static: it
specifies a relation between symbols and the world rather than specifying how those
symbols are used. To illustrate this new approach in familiar territory, I will provide
a semantics for propositional logic consisting of equations with the form s[φ] = s′.
While many have proposed systems in the vicinity of this, including Kamp (),
Heim (), and Groenendijk and Stokhof (), what will follow is basically the
system presented in Veltman ().32 The intuitive idea is that using φ consists in
moving from state s to state s′. With programs, the states were machine states, but
what are states now?The goal here is to use the formal language of propositional logic
to model the use of natural language. I will take s to be the state of information in
the conversation or inquiry: s is the set of worlds compatible with what the agents’
are assuming for the purpose of the exchange. Formally, filling out an equation of the
form s[φ] = s′ consists in saying for any given set of worlds s, the set of worlds s′ that
31 This interpretation and solution are a wink to Rothschild () who, essentially, uses lifted states
like this to address a related problem for pure expressive disjunctions. Mixed disjunctions, however, are
not modeled there.This is the only reason Rothschild () can do without a special disjunction pragmatic
update rule. Formore on themotivations for imprecise credences and pointers to that literature see Halpern
(, §.).
32 Unlike Veltman (, p. ) but like Groenendijk et al. (, §) I will treat conjunction as
sequential update. Unlike Groenendijk et al. (, §) but like Veltman (, p. ) I will treat disjunction
as forming the union of parallel updates to the initial state.
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result from interpreting φ. Intuitively, this means saying how processing φ requires
the agents’ to adjust the information they are assuming in their exchange. To save a
few words I will say that s′ is the result of updating s with φ.
Definition  (Compositional Semantics).
() s[p] = {w ∈ s | w(p) = } () s[¬φ] = s − s[φ]
() s[φ ∧ ψ] = (s[φ])[ψ] () s[φ ∨ ψ] = s[φ] ∪ s[ψ]
Atomic sentences eliminate possibilities incompatible with their truth. For complex
sentences, the equations specify how the interpretation of φ depends on interpreting
its constituents. Negation eliminates the possibilities compatible with its scope. Con-
junctions update with each of their conjuncts in sequence. Disjunctions update with
each of their disjuncts in parallel and form the union of each result. The clause for
atomic sentences directly appeals to truth/reference in specifying the interpretation
procedure for an atomic sentence. But note that unlike in the classical semantics
the connectives here are not given a representational interpretation. Intuitively, they
do not work by increasing the precision with which one can refer to distinctions
between possible worlds. They increase the space of transitions between states the
language can traverse. This different understanding of expressive power is the crucial
difference between dynamic and classical semantics. It allows one to conceive of two
different ways to make the language more expressive: add operators which discern
finer distinctions in the space of possible worlds, and add operators which trace more
transitions through the space of states. The key in understanding the relationships
between the two forms of semantics comes to this: what kinds of transitions amount
to drawing distinctions between possible worlds andwhat kinds of transitions amount
to something else? One way of answering this in the present context is considering
which operators exploit operating on a whole set of worlds rather than considering
each world in isolation. In systems such as that above where s[φ] ⊆ s, this formal
difference amounts to whether or not the update is distributive.33
Definition  (Distributive). s[φ] is distributive just in case s[φ] = ⋃{{w}[φ] | w ∈ s}.
The semantics above is distributive, and so the underlying language does not ‘do
anything’ which does not amount to making distinctions between possible worlds.
This is what I will eventually give up. The possibility of doing so hangs crucially on
the fact that dynamic semantics furnishes logical concepts more general than those
employed in truth-conditional semantics.
A more general conception of meaning is molded by a more general conception of
logic. Instead of truth, dynamic semantics builds its logic on support.
Definition  (Support, Truth in w).
() Support s  φ ⇔ s[φ] = s () Truth in w w  φ ⇔ {w}[φ] = {w}
33 This property is sometimes also called continuity, and has been isolated as a key feature by van Eijck
and Visser (, §.), Muskens et al. (, p. ) and van Benthem (, p. ).
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Generally, a state s supportsφ just in case interpretingφ requires no change in s.Where
s is an information state this means that interpreting φ requires no change in that
information. (Equivalently: [φ] is a fixed point with respect to s.) Support is more
general than truth: truth in a world in a special case of support. φ is true in w just
in case accepting φ requires no change to perfect information about w: {w}.34 This
definition of truth makes plain that non-distributive dynamic meanings are the non-
classical ones: they are the ones where support, rather than truth, is necessary.
Support is the basic logical concept in the sense that consequence and consistency
are defined in terms of it. ψ a consequence of φ just in case updating any state with φ
results in a state that supports ψ .
Definition  (Dynamic Consequence).
φ, . . . ,φn  ψ ⇔ ∀s: s[φ] · · · [φn]  ψ
The basic idea is that any agent who accepts the premises is committed to accept-
ing the conclusion (or rejecting those premises) because accepting the conclusion
in the resulting state requires no more information than is already possessed; they
are making no additional commitments about what the world is like. Consistency is
also defined in non-propositional terms: there is a non-absurd state of information
which supports each of φ, . . . ,φn. That is, there is a single informational perspective
which supports all of the sentences.
Definition  (Dynamic Consistency).
φ, . . . ,φn are consistent ⇔ ∃s = ∅: s  φ, . . . , s  φn
Throughout, I’ve emphasized that the dynamic system presented is a generalization of
the classical one. It is worthmaking this more explicit. On the dynamic semantics, one
can still define propositional content.
Definition  (Propositional Content). [[φ]] = {w | w  φ}
Taken with the dynamic compositional semantics from Definition , this implies the
classical compositional semantics (Veltman, ).
Corollary  (Possible Worlds Semantics).
() [[p]] = {w ∈ W | w(p) = } () [[¬φ]] = W − [[φ]]
() [[φ ∧ ψ]] = [[φ]] ∩ [[ψ]] () [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]] = [[φ]] ∪ [[ψ]]
Thus, even though propositions do not directly figure in the compositional clauses
and connectives are not propositional operators (they actually combine update pro-
cedures), the dynamic semantics behaves exactly as if these classical ideas were
operative. Propositions do not directly figure in the definitions of consequence or
consistency either. Just as truth is a special case of support, classical consequence and
consistency are special cases of the dynamic notions.
34 This definition is mentioned, but not adopted, by Muskens et al. (, p. ).
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Definition  (Classical Consequence).
([[φ]] ∩ · · · ∩ [[φn]]) ⊆ [[ψ]] ⇔ ∀w: {w}[φ] · · · [φn]  ψ
Definition  (Classical Consistency).
([[φ]] ∩ · · · ∩ [[φn]]) = ∅ ⇔ ∃w: {w}  φ, . . . , {w}  φn
In full generality, dynamic consequence and consistency are not equivalent to the
classical notions. But restricted to the language of propositional logicwith the dynamic
semantics of Definition , they are. This follows rather directly from the fact that all
updates in the present semantics amount to information gain: eliminating possibilities.
Fact  (Update is Propositional Communication).
Given the semantics of Definition : ∀φ: s[φ] = s ∩ [[φ]]
This fact not only means that the notions of consequence and consistency are equiv-
alent to their classical counterparts. It also means that the account of communication
is equivalent: communication works by providing information, i.e. referring to some
aspect of the world and stating a fact about it. As long as this equivalence holds,
the difference between dynamic and classical semantics is purely conceptual. This
conceptual difference resides in the centrality of support, rather than truth, to dynamic
semantics.This conceptual differencemakes room for a non-equivalent accountwhich
preserves the virtues of the classical account, albeit with non-classical definitions
of compositional meaning, consequence, consistency and communication. But the
classical logician cannot charge the dynamic logician with a change of topic. The
classical definitions are a special case of the non-classical ones. The disagreement is
thus not one of subject matter, but of breadth. It is easy to see how this disagreement is
relevant to the debate about expressivism. Frege and Geach took the narrow classical
concepts as given. But what happens when the more general concepts are embraced?
 Dynamic Expressivism about Deontic Modality
The equivalence between the dynamic and classical definitions in § can be broken.
In this section I will provide a dynamic semantics where the updates assigned to
must claims have the distinctive expressivist property: they do not communicate by
providing information, i.e. they do not refer to some part of the world and provide
information about it. Instead, they promote certain preferences and then test that
those preferences make the scope of the modal a practical necessity/possibility. I will
first present the semantics and then turn back to the key issues from the discussion of
expressivism above.The first step will be tomodel states that reflect not just the agents’
information, but their motivations.
. What are States?
Here is my answer to the question:

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Definition  (States). A state S = {s , . . . , smn } is a set of substates 〈si,j〉.
() Each si is a set of worlds compatible with what the agents are mutually suppos-
ing, and is competing to be the information they are mutually supposing.
() Each preference frame j= 〈j,∼j〉 consists of two relations, j and ∼j,
onW.
• Where w j w′ just in case w is strictly more preferred than w′ and j is
competing to guide the agents
• Where w ∼j w′ just in case w is equally preferred to w′ and∼j is competing
to guide the agents
() Each substate 〈si,j〉 consists of information si and a preference framej.
() Notation: s := 〈s,〉 and any set theoretic notation applied to ‘s’ is
understood as being applied to s, e.g. s ⊆ W means that s ⊆ W.
Of course, it may be helpful to hear why each of these components is here and how
states are being interpreted. Those who wish to skip those niceties, proceed to §.,
but have a peek at Definition  along the way.
I will follow a developed tradition in decision theory and model an agent’s motiva-
tional state as an ordering of worlds, wherew  w′ means thatw is strictly preferred to
w′, and w ∼ w′ to mean that w and w′ are equally preferred.35 While it is common to
just use a weak preference ordering and define equal and strict preference in terms
of it, this will not work for my purposes. My analysis of inconsistency ofMust(φ) and
Must(¬φ) will require modeling the irrational state of strictly preferring φ-worlds to
¬φ-worlds and vice versa. On a weak preference analysis, this cannot be distinguished
from the perfectly rational state of φ and ¬φ-worlds being equally preferred. At the
same time, I cannot dowith just strict preference. I will need equal preference tomodel
a state where ¬Must(φ) has been accepted, but Must(¬φ) has not: since the agents
find φ and ¬φ equally preferable they reject that they must φ, but also reject that
they must ¬φ.36 So I propose to capture the motivational component of states using
a preference frame, which is a pair consisting of these two relations on worlds: 〈,∼〉.
To simplify notation, I’ll refer to a frame as a whole with ‘’ but reserve ‘’ or ‘∼’ for
use between worlds.
As has already surfaced, rational preferences have certain properties, e.g. strict ones
are acyclic, equal ones are reflexive. But I’ve already said that I am not limiting this
model to rational states. Some take these properties to be definitional of preferences
so it is important for me to articulate a different view. I do not take preference to
35 Some gloss w ∼ w′ as indifference but this gives the misleading impression that the agent doesn’t care
about w and w′ at all.
36 Appropriately capturing the distinction between ¬Must(φ) and Must(¬φ) is a well-documented
difficulty for expressivism (Unwin, ; Schroeder, c; Dreier, ), and so one this analysis must
solve.
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be reducible to choice behavior, but I will assume that preferences have a function:
to motivate choice. This functional account assumes that rational preferences have
the properties they do because those are the properties they must have to achieve
their function of motivating choice. This idea about the function of preferences
will be important when I discuss consistency, and it should recall the discussion of
consistency at the end of §.
Even though I will not require preferences to be rational, their rationality will
nonetheless be relevant. It is important to be clear about how. Their first relevance
will be in the pragmatics: I will assume that a speech act which brings about irrational
preferences is unstable: the discourse participants will not be satisfied with it. Their
second relevance is in the semantics for deontic modals. For example, Must(φ) will
test whether the alternatives which may be rationally chosen are the φ-alternatives. If
the underlying preferences are not rational, this test is sure to fail since no alternatives
may be rationally chosen from irrational preferences. This means that I must say
more about how alternatives are rationally chosen, and which properties this requires
preferences to have.This is obviously an enormous and delicate issue, but all I will need
below is two plausible claims about rational choice: (i) rational agents can choose any
alternative which is not dominated by—strictly less preferred than—an alternative; (ii)
if w can be rationally chosen and w ∼ w′, then w′ can be chosen.37 The set of rational
alternatives to choose from a space of worlds s can then be defined as follows.
Definition  (Choice Possibilities).
Choice(s,) := {w ∈ s | w ∈ Nd or ∃w′ ∈ Nd:w ∼ w′}
• Nd(s,) := {w ∈ s | w′ ∈ s:w′  w}
• Choice possibilities in s are either non-dominated, or equally preferable to some
w ∈ s that is.
On this conception of choice, a cyclic strict preference ordering such as w  w′,w′ 
w has the function of promoting the choice of both w and w′, but discounts both. It is
thereby irrational. There are many other properties rational preference must have on
this definition, but asymmetry is the only one that will be crucial below.
I seem to have arrived at a good model of states: a space of worlds and a preference
frame 〈s,〉. But, for the reasons discussed at the end of §, disjunctions featuring
deontic modals challenge such a model. At least in the static setting this challenge
motivated a higher type for states, namely a set of these pairs. I will also adopt this
higher type. Here’s why. Suppose 〈s,〉 was the form states take. A standard idea is
thatMust(φ) tests that the ‘choice’ worlds in 〈s,〉 are the φ-worlds.38
37 See Hansson and Grüne-Yanoff (, §.).
38 This is a deontic adaptation of Veltman’s (, p. ) presumably; see also Portner (, p. ),
definition ..
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Definition  (Simple Test Semantics).
〈s,〉[Must(φ)] =
{〈s,〉 if 〈s,〉[φ] = 〈Choice(s,),〉
〈∅,〉 otherwise
Consider a scenario where Pat is coming to visit Alex, who lives in a neighborhood
where parking is allowed only on one side of the street, depending on the day. Alex
knows that today, parking on the left is required, so he might tell Pat You must park
on the left. The idea, as Veltman (, pp. –) puts it, is for Pat to test whether
the information and preferences in play have the property in question: are the choice
worlds the live worlds where Pat parks on the left? If so, then proceed as before with
〈s,〉, otherwise 〈∅,〉 spurs Pat to adjust  so that the test is passed. Since the
preferences in this case are new to Pat, he must adjust the preferences he takes to be at
play. Importantly, this adjustment is a pragmatic process on this analysis.
Focusing now on disjunction, one must first generalize the semantics from Defi-
nition . to the new form of states. The simplest idea is to union the information
provided by each disjunct and keep the input ordering:
() 〈s,〉[φ ∨ ψ] = 〈sφ ∪ sψ ,〉, where 〈s,〉[φ] = 〈sφ ,〉 and 〈s,〉[ψ] =
〈sψ ,〉.
Consider a similar scenario in which Pat is coming to visit Alex, but Alex cannot
remember which day goes with which side. Alex might then tell Pat:
() You must park on the left side of the street or you must park on the right side
of the street (I can’t remember which).
As before, the preferences are new to Pat, so the disjunction in () leads to the state
〈∅,〉. Patmust revise the preferences, but how shouldwe represent the state he enters
when he does so? Switching to a strict ordering L which ranks parking-on-the-left
worlds over parking-on-the-right-worlds, will lead to the state 〈s,L〉. But this means
that Pat would know what to do: park on the left. The same goes for an ordering
that prefers parking-on-the-right worlds. There is no clear candidate to represent the
uncertainty Alex expresses. What is needed is for the pragmatic process of adjusting
 to happen semantically, when each disjunct is interpreted, and then to somehow
combine the results into one state. The first task is tractable, and will be carried out
in §., Definition ..39 The hard question is how to combine those two augmented
strict orderings L and R into one that captures an undecided state. Forming the
union of the two orderings produces an irrational set of symmetric strict preferences
where parking on the left is strictly preferred to parking on the right and vice versa.
Moving to a frame where parking on the left and on the right are equally preferred
is also problematic. Alex has pretty explicitly expressed that the two options aren’t
39 Veltman’s (, p. ) normally works this way, but I will pursue yet another way.
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equally good, just that she can’t say which is better. Whatever she is conveying, it
seems to leave both orderings open. A simplemove can capture this idea: states are sets
of 〈s,〉.40 So interpreting Alex’s disjunction results in the state {〈s,L〉, 〈s,R〉}.
The idea is not that agents posses a representation of their preferences which fails to
distinguish these two options. Instead, both preferences are competing for control of
their choices. Given her epistemic state, all Alex can do is induce this competition
among Pat’s preferences.41
. The Semantics
Recall the guiding slogan for the expressivist:Must(φ) promotes certain motivational
attitudes towards φ.42 The difficult part for semantically implementing this slogan has
been ‘promotion’. The essential idea of the semantics I will offer is that this promotion
consists in adding a strict preference for φ-worlds. More precisely, Must(φ) extends
each existing strict preference ordering by ranking each live φ-world over each live
¬φ-world. This preference update is defined below as φ+(). It simply extends 
with a strict preference for each φ-world over each ¬φ-world and leaves ∼ as it was.
Crucially, the semantics also tests, for every substate, that this augmented ordering
makes φ a practical necessity: the choice worlds are the φ-worlds.43 This test relates
the preference update to the information supposed in the interaction.44
Definition  (Dynamic Expressivist Semantics).
S[Must(φ)] =
⎧
⎨
⎩
{sφ+() | s ∈ S} if ∀s ∈ S:Choice(sφ+()) = sφ
{∅φ+() | s ∈ S} otherwise
• sφ :=
⋃
({s}[φ])
◦ sφ is the set of φ-worlds in s.
40 This allows variation along both axes: {〈s ,〉, 〈s ,〉}, {〈s ,〉, 〈s,〉}, and {〈s ,〉, 〈s,〉}
are all states. Variation along the informational axis is needed for mixed disjunctions such as A ∨ Must(B).
41 This idea of various states competing for control of an agent’s actions is widespread in artificial
intelligence, in particular in the use of evolutionary algorithms to model adaptive problem solving. See
Franklin (, Chapter ) for a helpful overview. This seems in the spirit of Blackburn’s () being ‘tied
to a tree.’
42 Ninan () is a clear predecessor of this view, but is ambivalent about whether the ordering-
effect is semantic. Making this effect semantic is essential for expressivist purposes: it makesMust(A) and
¬Must(A) inconsistent in a non-representational way.
43 I here defineMay(φ) as the dual ofMust(φ), but a less conservative option is worth noting:May(φ)
creates a new substate in which φ-worlds are preferred to ¬φ-worlds, and tests that φ is consistent
with the choice worlds in each substate. Given the logical definitions to follow this predicts free-choice
permission patterns: May(A) ∨ May(B)  May(A) and May(A ∨ B)  May(A) while ¬May(A ∨ B) 
¬May(A) ∧ ¬May(B).
44 Note that this account captures both performative and descriptive uses of deontic modals within the
same semantics: descriptive ones are those issued in a state that already contains the preference it promotes
and performative ones are those issue in a state that previously lacked that preference. Of course, pragmatic
social conditions concerning authority govern when performative uses are felicitous.
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• φ+() := 〈{〈w,w′〉 ∈ s × s | w  w′ or,w ∈ sφ & w′ ∈ s¬φ},∼〉
◦ φ+() adds to  a preference for each w ∈ sφ over each w′ ∈ s¬φ .
• May(φ) := ¬Must(¬φ)
After all, this is a model of declarative modal sentences and interacting with informa-
tion is the function of declaratives.The fact that they have some relation to information
makes them suitable to negate and embed under believe. But they hardly work by
providing information, and they certainly do not eliminate worlds by referring to a
distinction in each world. Their key contribution is the promotion of preferences and
this seems on track for expressivist aims. It is rather crucial for these aims that the
test component of the meaning is not redundant. After all, that would mean that an
update with any deontic modal claim will succeed. To see why the preference update
does not guarantee that the test will be passed, consider the fact that the incoming
preferences may be inhospitable. The test asks whether the alternatives a rational
agent could choose according to the augmented preferences are φ-alternatives. But
if the augmentation leads to an irrational body of preferences, then the choice set
will be empty. (That’s why those preferences are irrational.) To illustrate, consider
a simple scenario where the agents have narrowed in on two worlds, an A-world
w and a ¬A-world w. Further suppose the agents’ only strict preference is for w
over w and the agents only equally prefer each world to itself:  = {〈w,w〉} and
∼ = {〈w,w〉, 〈w,w〉}. The agents’ state is then modeled as {{w,w} }. The first
thing that an update withMust(A) will do is create a new preference ordering where
w is also strictly preferred to w: A+() = 〈{〈w,w〉, 〈w,w〉},∼〉. But such a
preference ordering is irrational. Its symmetric preference guarantees that there are
no non-dominated worlds, thus: Choice({w,w}A+()) = ∅.That meansMust(A) is
testing that there are no A-worlds. Since w is an A-world, this test is failed, resulting
in the state ∅A
+(). The information∅ in this result state reflects that it is not stable
and the preferences explain why: A+() is irrational.The agents then face a choice of
which preference to jettison. I do not have space to elaborate how I see that pragmatic
process unfolding, but suffice it to say that it may involve debate about the particular
preferences, or less conscious deference based on social influences.
As it turns out,  is the ordering that would have resulted from updating a
state with an empty strict ordering and trivial equality ordering {{w,w}〈∅,∼〉} with
Must(¬A). This allows me to sketch how I propose to explain the inconsistency of
Must(¬A) andMust(A): there is no rational preference ordering which contains both
the preferences they promote. If the state is going to contain the preferencesMust(A)
promotes, it is going to strictly prefer A-worlds to ¬A-worlds. If the state is going to
contain the preferencesMust(¬A) promotes, it is going to strictly prefer¬A-worlds to
A-worlds. But any state containing both will be irrational in the sense that it contains
dysfunctional preferences. To fill out this explanation, and treat the harder case of
Must(A) and ¬Must(A), a semantics for negation (and atomics) is needed.
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Apart fromnegation, the semantics for the rest of the language parallelsDefinition .
Atomics eliminate worlds where they are false from each substate. Conjunction is
still sequential update and disjunction is again the union of parallel updates to the
initial state. This semantics for disjunction does generate a new behavior, but I will
return to that. Focus now on negation:¬φ not only removes the information φ would
provide (as before), it removes the preferences that φ would promote.45 This is done
by subtracting any preferences that φ would add to an empty ordering.
Definition  (Dynamic Expressivist Boolean Semantics).
. S[p] = {{w ∈ s | w(p) = } | s ∈ S}
. S[¬φ] = {sφ−() − ⋃({s}[φ]) | s ∈ S}
• φ−() := 〈 − {〈w,w′〉 ∈ i | {W〈∅,=〉}[φ] = {s , . . . , smn } &   i 
m},∼〉
• φ−() removes from  any pairs that updating with φ would add to an
empty ordering. For non-expressive discourse this will idle. Ifφ = Must(ψ)
this will extract preferences for ψ-worlds over ¬ψ-worlds.
. S[φ ∧ ψ] = S[φ][ψ]
. S[φ ∨ ψ] = S[φ] ∪ S[φ]
Since descriptive discourse never adds preferences, negations of descriptive sentences
will behave exactly as before.However, when an expressive sentence is negated both the
preferences it would promote and the information it would provide are removed. Con-
sider again the example from above where testing the state {{w,w} }withMust(A)
failed, returning∅A
+().What if one updates that same state with¬Must(A) instead?
The semantics predicts that this returns the initial state {{w,w} } via the following
process. It would first arrive at the state ∅A
+() and then find the informational
difference {w,w} − ∅ and the preferential difference Must(A)−(A+()). Since
Must(A)−(A+()) = ,46 this results in the original state {{w,w} }.The fact that
negation dynamically manipulates preferences in this way guarantees that there will
be no state, not even an irrational one, which contains the preferences bothMust(A)
and ¬Must(A) promote. If that state already has the preferences in it that Must(A)
would add, then¬Must(A) would remove them. Conversely, if the state already lacks
the preferences ¬Must(A) would remove thenMust(A) would add them. This is the
gist of my expressivist explanation of why Must(A) and ¬Must(A) are inconsistent.
45 This analysis of negation is inspired by the converse operator of Dynamic Logic (Harel et al., ,
p. ), which serves as a variety of program negation. While there is a growing literature on using dynamic
logic for deontic reasoning, it does not directly speak to the key issues here.
46 Recall that  = {〈w,w〉}, so A+() = {〈w ,w〉, 〈w,w〉}. Then Must(A)−(A+()) =
Must(A)−({〈w ,w〉, 〈w,w〉}). To findMust(A)−({〈w ,w〉, 〈w,w〉}) one removes any strict preference
that ends up in the result state of {W〈∅,=〉}[Must(A)] = {W〈{〈w ,w〉,...},=〉}. So 〈w ,w〉 is removed from
{〈w ,w〉, 〈w,w〉} leaving {〈w,w〉} = .
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However, recall that {{w,w} } is a state where the test imposed by Must(¬A)
is also successful. How exactly are ¬Must(A) and Must(¬A) distinguished on this
semantics? This is where states with equally preferred worlds are required.
Consider a state where w ∼w, and there are no strict preferences. Intuitively,
this state supports ¬Must(A), but not Must(¬A). If one prefers A and ¬A equally,
one definitely isn’t compelled to choose only ¬A-worlds or to choose only A-
worlds. The first fact means that one rejects Must(¬A), while the second means
that one accepts ¬Must(A). To see how the formalism above replicates this intu-
itive reasoning, consider a state {s} where s = {w,w}, = ∅, and ∼ =
{〈w,w〉, 〈w,w〉, 〈w,w〉, 〈w,w〉}. Updating {s}withMust(¬A)will augment
to = {〈w,w〉} (leaving∼ as it was), and test whether the choice worlds relative to
the augmented ordering are the¬A-worlds: {w}.The only non-dominated alternative
in  is w, but recall that w ∼ w. Since any choice world is either non-dominated,
or equally preferred to a non-dominated one, the choice worlds are {w,w} and so
the test is failed. In the same way, the test for Must(A) will fail, and result in the
state {∅ }, where  = {〈w,w〉}. But this means that updating the original state
with ¬Must(A) will involve taking the informational difference {w,w} − ∅ and
removing the preference 〈w,w〉. And so an update of {s} with ¬Must(A) returns
{s} while an update of {s} with Must(¬A) returns {∅ }. In other words: {s}
supports ¬Must(A) but does not supportMust(¬A).
It is important to note that I do not distinguish ¬Must(A) and Must(¬A) by
appealing to a state where there are two competing substates, one where A is strictly
preferred and one where ¬A is strictly preferred, e.g. {{w,w} , {w,w} }. That
is the kind of state that results from updating with Must(A) ∨ Must(¬A).47 This
is not a state which supports ¬Must(A). Updating with ¬Must(A) after updating
with the disjunction would change the preferences and lead one to rule out the
substate produced by the left disjunct, thereby bringing one to a state where only
the substate produced by the right disjunct remains. In other words, one would
infer Must(¬A). This illustrates why it is so important to distinguish ¬Must(A)
fromMust(A) ∨ Must(¬A). Conflating them straightforwardly leads to a collapse of
¬Must(A) into Must(¬A) (Unwin, ; Schroeder, c; Dreier, ). Mention
of logical matters highlights the fact that above I have been relying on the logical
notions of support and consequence roughly in the vein of §. But it is crucial to make
these notions explicit and to note that they arise in the way expressivists require. In
particular it will be important to see how the semantic properties of deontic sentences
are explained by properties of the attitudes they express.
47 This dynamic semantics of disjunction comes fromStarr ()where it is used to analyze disjunctions
of imperatives, declaratives (and combinations thereof). It works by dynamically generalizing the idea
that disjunctions introduce alternative propositions (Kratzer and Shimoyama, ; Simons, ; Alonso-
Ovalle, ), to the idea that disjunctions introduce alternative updates.
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. Expressivism Redux
How does dynamic expressivism explain the logical relations between expressive sen-
tences? Can one simply adopt the definitions of support, consistency and consequence
from §, or does the added dynamics of preference make other definitions suitable?
Since support is the central logical concept, that is the place to start. Generalizing
the previous definition of support (§, Definition ) would amount to saying that S
supports φ when S[φ] = S. This is a rather strict form of support which uniformly
requires no change to the information, number of substates or preferences of S. This
notion of support yields an interesting, though radically non-classical, logic. However,
for the purposes here it is somewhat more illuminating and conservative to consider
two parallel notions of support, one specialized to information, one to preferences.48
Definition  (Informational Support). S  φ ⇐⇒ iS = iS[φ]
• iS = ⋃{s | ∃: s ∈ S}
Definition  (Preferential Support). S  φ ⇐⇒ PrefS = PrefS[φ]
• PrefS = { | ∃s = ∅: s ∈ S}
Informational support is familiar from §, but preferential support tracks the addi-
tional expressive dimension added by deontic modals. It requires that the preference
frames in S stay the same after updating with φ and that φ does not add any preference
frames.49 This furnishes two notions of consequence and of consistency:
Definition  (Informational Consequence). φ, . . . ,φn  ψ ⇐⇒ ∀S: S[φ] · · ·
[φn]  ψ
Definition  (Preferential Consequence). φ, . . . ,φn  ψ ⇐⇒ ∀S: S[φ] · · ·
[φn]  ψ
Definition  (Informational Consistency).
φ, . . . ,φn are informationally consistent ⇐⇒ ∃S: iS = ∅ & S  φ, . . . , S  φn
Definition  (Preferential Consistency).
φ, . . . ,φn are preferentially consistent ⇐⇒ ∃S:Ch(S) = ∅ & S  φ, . . . , S  φn
• Where Ch(S) = ⋃{Choice(s,) | s ∈ S}
48 There is actually a third to consider, choice-support, which produces a more classical logic forMust:
S choice-supports φ just in case
⋃{Choice(s,) | s ∈ S} = ⋃{Choice(s,) | s ∈ S[φ]}. This will
predict that both Must(φ) and Must(ψ) are consequences of Must(φ ∧ ψ). However it also predicts that
Must(φ ∨ ψ) is a consequence ofMust(φ). See § for discussion of these principles.
49 It also discounts changes to the preferences that concern only problematic substates whose informa-
tion is contradictory: ∅. Intuitively, those preferences are to be ignored since they are not constraining
agents’ choices: Choice(∅,) will always be ∅. This restriction is needed to predict that Must(B) is a
preferential consequence ofMust(A) ∨ Must(B) and ¬Must(A).
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• Recall: if Choice(s,) = ∅ then is dysfunctional, i.e. fails to motivate a choice.
– E.g. if is cyclic over s, Choice(s,) = ∅
For informational consistency, I require a state that is not representationally dys-
functional to informationally support each of the sentences. By contrast, preferential
consistency requires a state that is not motivationally dysfunctional to preferentially
support each of the sentences. This allows a non-representational explanation of con-
sistency which parallels our representational explanations. For example,A and¬A are
inconsistent because their function is to provide information to iS, iS has the function
of representing theworld, but only a dysfunctional iS has the information each of them
provides. Similarly, Must(A) and Must(¬A) are inconsistent because their function
is to update the preferences in PrefS, PrefS has the function of motivating choices but
only a dysfunctionalPrefS contains the preferences each of thempromotes. Recall from
above that a state which contains a symmetric strict preference ordering ranking A-
worlds over¬A-worlds and¬A-worlds overA-worlds will preferentially support both
Must(A) and Must(¬A). But such a state is motivationally dysfunctional: Ch(S) =
∅. It is important to highlight that Must(A) and ¬Must(A) are inconsistent for
a different reason. It is not that only an irrational state can support both. It’s that
there is no state which supports both because they perform converse updates on the
preferences. If a state has the preferences that Must(A) would add, then ¬Must(A)
would remove them. If a state lacks the preferences ¬Must(A) would remove then
Must(A) would add them. This is an essentially dynamic form of inconsistency: one
formula builds something which the other removes. It is precisely this resource which
pragmatic expressivism lacked, and which made its explanation of the inconsistency
between ¬Must(A) and Must(A) seem suspiciously representational. The beauty
of the dynamic account is that one can add this new element while keeping the
explanations of consistency parallel. In both the motivational and representational
cases, consistency is allied with a function our mental states serve, and inconsistent
sentences are explained by the fact that if they can be embraced by a single state at all,
it is a dysfunctional state.
It was hard to motivate the pragmatic expressivist view that the contents com-
municated by deontics were non-representational. Those contents seemed open to a
representational interpretation since they were reified from a representational theory
of consequence and had identical dynamics. On the dynamic view, the underlying
theory of consequence is not inherently representational. It tracks various fixed points
in the interpretive process—in information, preferences, etc. Even though it has a rep-
resentational edition—when that fixed point concerns information—the conception
of logic ismore general. It is precisely thismore general approach tomeaning and logic
that is essential to capturing the expressive dimension of deontic modals.
On the semantics in Definitions  and , updates involving deontic modals do
not refer to preferences and describe them. Those sentences promote and discount
preferences. This variety of update differs radically from descriptive, informational
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updates. Crucially, they differ not just in the contents (preferences vs propositions)
they manipulate, but in how those contents are manipulated.50 The adding and
removing of preferences is quite different from the way descriptive discourse works.
Descriptive discourse provides information by making distinctions between worlds.
As I mentioned in §, this way of providing information can be formally charac-
terized as a distributive and eliminative update: s[φ] = ⋃{{w}[φ] | w ∈ s},
and s[φ] ⊆ s. One way of putting the problem for pragmatic expressivism was
that it was indistinguishable from a view where expressive discourse works via a
distributive and eliminative update over more fine-grained worlds such as 〈w,〉. It
then becomes hard to elucidate the expressivist communication thesis, since it looks as
if expressive communication works by making distinctions between centered worlds,
and one of those distinctions is made by referring to preferences. But on the dynamic
view, the fact that preferences are added, while worlds are removed, guarantees that
preference update and information update cannot be the same process. Indeed, on
the dynamic account there are four kinds of updates: adding preferences (deontic
modals), removing preferences (negation), eliminatingworlds (atomics, negation) and
creating substates (disjunction). Language compositionally interleaves these distinct
processes rather than providing a single semantic object which is factored into distinct
contributions.
Ultimately, the dynamic account makes room for the expressivist communica-
tion thesis by breaking from the traditional ‘conduit’ metaphor for communication:
expressing yourself is like putting a package on a conveyor belt between minds.
That metaphor assumes there is a discrete object shared and a single process by
which you unpack the box and sort the contents. On the dynamic approach, a better
metaphor would be two minds connected by a series of vibrating cords which encode
different modalities with different frequency ranges. Language is a virtuosic tool for
weaving these frequencies and modalities together. This departure from the conduit
metaphor is far from a debt for expressivists. It is one urged by researchers not debating
expressivism and spanning the fields of animal communication (Owren et al., ;
Scott-Phillips and Kirby, ) and natural language (Murray and Starr, ).
 A Wider View
I want to conclude this chapter by taking a wider view and being clear about what
has and has not been accomplished. I claim to have offered a dynamic semantics
which vindicates the expressivist communication thesis, and done so better than
competing pragmatic accounts. Dynamic meanings were essential for implementing
the expressive effect of deontic modals, and generalizing our familiar semantics for
50 Varieties of update is an allusion toMurray (), which exploits dynamic semantics to composition-
ally interleave a number of distinct update processes. It is there applied to a number of constructions across
languages which manipulate but differentiate at-issue and not-at-issue content.
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negation so as to interact with that expressive effect. This provided a new expressivist
solution to the negation problem. Must(A) and ¬Must(A) have converse dynamic
effects, which predicts that they are inconsistent because there is no state that can
contain the converse effects of their updates.Must(A) andMust(¬A) are inconsistent
because only irrational preferences support them. Itwas argued that these explanations
of inconsistency perfectly parallel those for descriptive discourse.There is nevertheless
much work left to do. There are still several constructions which have not been
analysed here and may turn out to be problematic. For example, the interaction
of modals with attitude verbs, modal questions, deontic predicates/adverbs such as
wrong/wrongly, more complex modals such as ought, should, could and non-deontic
uses of must and may all lie outside the scope of the analysis here.51 Further-
more, at some point one would like a positive argument in favor of an expressivist
semantics over the impressive achievements of its descriptive competitors such as
Kratzer (, ). This must wait for another day, but some suggestive remarks
on a few fronts may help chart the territory where such an argument might be
found.
The compositional virtuosity of the dynamic account was essential for analyzing
mixed disjunctions. It explained how communicating Must(A) ∨ B was different
from communicating Must(A) or communicating B. The disjunction involves a
distinctive substate-creating update, where quite different updates are unleashed on
each incoming substate to create two new substates. It is worth highlighting how this
addresses the concern raised by Schroeder () about the interaction of expressive
modals and attitude verbs. That concern is whether BelX(Must(A) ∨ B) will entail
BelX(Must(A)) ∨ BelX(B).BelX(φ) can be analyzed as a descriptive update requiring
of a world w that the state SX modeling X’s state of mind in w both informationally
and preferentially supports φ. But consider a world in which SX is a state with two
substates: SX = {sA , sB }, the first has information s and an ordering which prefers
A-worlds, and the second lacks that particular preference but has the information
carried by B. SX will preferentially and informationally support Must(A) ∨ B. Yet
SX will not preferentially supportMust(A), since PrefSX[Must(A)] will lack . Also, SX
will not informationally support B, since iSX[B] will exclude the ¬B worlds in s. Thus
BelX(Must(A) ∨ B) will not informationally entail BelX(Must(A)) ∨ BelX(B). The
success of this analysis would not surprise Schroeder (). He acknowledges that if
belief ascriptions mix information and motivation, and there is a special sort of state
for believing disjunctions, then the entailment can be blocked. What he doubts is a
philosophically plausible interpretation of these constructs. Even the small amount I
have said here suggests a way of resisting this doubt. A substate is an informational
and motivational perspective, and a state containing multiple substates captures the
perspectives competing for control over the agent’s actions.There seems to be no good
51 I think there is some hope for analysing ?Must(A) as S[Must(A)] ∪ S[¬Must(A)].
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philosophical or psychological motivation for assuming that beliefs are exclusively
informational or motivational, or that different perspectives can’t compete within
a single agent. Assuming beliefs are ‘purely informational’ seems philosophically
tidy, but psychologically implausible to me. Surely our actual beliefs are influenced
by the motivational perspective we adopt, just as our desires are influenced by the
informational perspective we adopt.52
The dynamic account allows one to articulate two components of a deontic modal’s
meaning: preference promotion and a test about that promotion. This leads one to
wonder whether language contains operators which simply promote preferences.That
is essentially Starr’s () analysis of imperatives:53
Definition  (Imperative Semantics). S[!φ] = {sφ+() | s ∈ S}
This illuminates one difference between deontic modals and imperatives. Unlike
deontic modals, negation does not scope over imperatives in natural language (Han,
). On the semantics above, negating an imperative would disastrously subtract
each s from itself, returning ∅ for each. Negation thus turns any imperative into
an informational contradiction. This goes some way towards explaining what many
other theories treat as an arbitrary syntactic restriction: negation scoped over an
imperative does not produce a useful meaning, so no human language should bother
to conventionalize those syntactic structures. Explaining this fact by syntactic stip-
ulation looks less satisfying when it becomes clear that languages allow imperatives
to robustly embed under other connectives: !A ∧ !B,A ∧ !B, !A ∨ !B,A ∨ !B (Starr,
). Starr () presents two related arguments that build on this observation.
First, it is argued there that no plausible non-propositional analysis of imperatives can
compositionally account for this behaviorwithout dynamicmeanings like those above.
Secondly, it is argued that non-propositional non-dynamic theories such as Portner
() incorrectly predict !(A ∧ B) to be a consequence of (!A∨!B)∨!(A ∧ B), but that
a dynamic theory such as the above does not. This highlights that dynamic meanings
provide not only new compositional resources, but logical ones too. I turn now to this
logical frontier of dynamic thinking.
The deontic realm is a minefield of logical problems, but some recent work sug-
gests that dynamic semantics provides resources for resolving them. Willer (),
for example, shows that a dynamic non-monotonic consequence relation relieves
the pressures placed on modus ponens in deontic settings by Chisholm’s Paradox
(Chisholm, ), theMiner’s Paradox (Kolodny andMacFarlane, ) and theGentle
52 Charlow () explores these issues in much more depth. He pursues an account which I learned
much from and which bears at least some affinities with the account pursued here.
53 Given this analysis of imperatives, one may draw a comparison between the semantics above and
the analysis in Ninan () where imperatives and deontic must have the same effect on context. On the
analysis above, the semantics of deonticmust includes that effect, but adds the crucial element of a test.This
approach also predicts Ninan’s () key data: ¬A ∧ Must(A) will be infelicitous. Further investigation
will be needed to see whether the added test element is empirically advantageous.
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Murder Paradox (Forrester, ). Willer, (this volume, Chapter ) elaborates on the
relationship between this kind of non-monotonic approach and one based on default
logic. The semantics above makes two predictions that may add momentum to this
movement. Suppose a father tells his son that he must take out the trash or do the
dishes. The son proceeds to the trashcan only to find that it has already been taken
out. The son should infer that he must wash the dishes. However, if the son goes to do
the dishes and they too have been taken care of, he may no longer sensibly think he
must wash the dishes. These are facts classical theories do not predict:
() Must(A ∨ B),¬A  Must(B)
() Must(A ∨ B),¬A,¬B  Must(B)
Just because the best worlds are allA ∨ Bworlds andwe aren’t in anA-world, it doesn’t
follow that all the best worlds areB-worlds. Further, the pattern in () seems to show
exactly the kind of non-monotonicity which classical consequence relations fail to
predict. By contrast, both patterns are predicted by the analysis above.
Now return to the scenario where the son has correctly inferred that he must do the
dishes. Note that he should not infer that he must do the dishes or watch a movie. He
also shouldn’t infer that either he must do the dishes or he must watch a movie:
() Must(B)  Must(B ∨ C)
() Must(B)  Must(B) ∨ Must(C)
This is a modal version of Ross’s Paradox (Ross, ) concerning imperatives. Their
validity in standard approaches to modality has been widely recognized as problem-
atic. Several attempts have been made to leverage pragmatic reasoning and a non-
standard semantics for disjunction to explain them (Zimmermann, ; Simons,
; Geurts, ; Aloni, ). Yet Cariani () and Lassiter () argue that a
strictly semantic approach is justified. While their semantic approach predicts (),
it does not, to my knowledge, predict (). The analysis above predicts both.54 While
none of these prospects constitutes a full empirical argument for the kind of dynamic
analysis pursued here, they illustrate some of the territory where those argumentsmay
evolve. It would, of course, also be unsurprising if dynamic expressivism proved useful
in the burgeoning literature on non-descriptive meaning.
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